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1
1 Introduction
The Serial Cost Sharing Rule has received much attention since its introduction by Shenker
(1990) and its extensive analysis by Moulin and Shenker (1992, 1994). It was originally
conceived for problems where n agents request diﬀerent quantities of a private good, the
sum of which is produced by a single facility. This rule can be constructed from two ethical
axioms: Equal Treatment of Equals (in terms of demands) and Independence of Larger
Demands (a protection of small demanders against larger ones). It satisfies other interesting
properties and has other characterizations as well.
In Téjédo and Truchon (2002), we introduced the Path Serial Cost Sharing Rule to deal
with situations where each agent requests a list of goods that may be private, public, or
specific to some agents and where aggregate demand is not necessarily the sum of individual
demands. This rule admits general paths along which demands may be scaled down to
construct intermediate demands. We showed that the Path Serial Rule is characterized by
the Equal Treatment of Equivalent Demands (in terms of stand alone costs) and the Path
Serial Principle (a weaker form of Independence of Larger Demands). It also satisfies a
general scale invariance condition defined and called Ordinality by Sprumont (1998).
In the present paper, we pursue the analysis of this rule by examining how the cost
share of an agent varies with respect to its own demand and the one of other agents. We
also provide bounds for cost shares under an appropriate assumption on the cost function.
Moulin and Shenker (1994) prove that, under appropriate assumptions on the cost function,
the original Serial Rule produces cost shares that are monotone with respect to own and
others’ demands and that lay between reasonable bounds. We transpose their results to the
Path Serial Rule by restricting Monotonicity and Cross Monotonicity to hold along paths.
Moulin (1996) shows that the original Serial Rule satisfies the Stand Alone Test, i.e. under
increasing returns, no agent and no subset of agents pay more than their stand alone cost.
We also extend this result to the Path Serial Rule.
The paper is organized as follows. For the sake of completeness, we give again the
complete formulation of the problem and the main definitions in Section 2. In particular,
we add a definition of “diminishing and increasing incremental cost”, which will be used to
define Path Cross Monotonicity and the Stand Alone Test. The Path Serial Cost Sharing
Rule is defined in Section 3. Monotonicity is the object of Section 4 while the bounds for
cost shares are dealt with in Section 5. A brief conclusion follows as Section 6. Most proofs
are collected in the last section.
2 The Cost Sharing Problem
A cost sharing problem starts with a profile of demands, to which a cost function is applied.
In some cases, as with serial cost sharing, demands may have to be scaled down to meet
certain conditions. The cost sharing problem must thus be completed by a description of
how this should be made. We address each of these elements in the next three subsections.
2.1 The demands
Throughout this paper, there is a fixed set of divisible commodities K = {1, . . . , k} and a
fixed set of agents N = {1, . . . , n} . The commodities may be goods, characteristics serving
to describe needs, or specifications of a certain facility. A commodity may be specific to a
particular agent or a subset of agents. This means that these agents are the only ones to be
able to consume, use, or enjoy the commodity in question. Hence, they will be the only ones
to demand positive quantities of this commodity. As for non specific commodities, they may
be private or public or anything in between.
For each agent i ∈ N, let there be a positive integer mi ≤ k and a one-to-one function
`i : {1, . . . ,mi} → K, specifying the list of commodities that may be requested by this
agent. Next, let Mi be the range of `i, i.e. Mi = {`i(1) , . . . , `i(mi)} . In plain words, Mi
is the subset of commodities for which agent i may request a positive quantity. We assume
that K = ∪ni=1Mi. Thus, for each commodity, there is at least one agent concerned by this
commodity.
The demand of agent i is described by a vector qi ∈ Rmi+ . The scalar qih is the demand of
commodity `i(h) ∈Mi by agent i. Let M = {M1, . . . ,Mn} with cardinality m =
Pn
i=1mi ≤
nk. A profile of demands is an element Q ∈ Rm+ =
Qn
i=1R
mi
+ . Given a subset S ⊂ N
and Q ∈ Rm+ , let QS ∈ Rm+ be the vector obtained from Q by changing all components
qj, j ∈ N\S, for components of 0.
2.2 The cost function
To complete the description of the problem, we assume that the agents jointly own a facility
to jointly produce any list of commodities that are requested. The cost of producing a
bundle Y ∈ Rm+ is C (Y ) . A special case is Mi = K ∀i and C (Y ) = c (
P
i yi) with c :
Rk+ → R+. In this case, all commodities are homogeneous and private. Following Moulin
and Shenker (1994) and Sprumont (1998), we call these functions and the resulting problems
homogeneous.
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A cost function C : Rm+ → R+ also induces n stand alone cost functions ci : Rmi+ → R+
defined by:
ci (yi) = C
¡
Y {i}
¢
∀i ∈ N
We shall say that ci : Rmi+ → R+ is increasing if yi ¿ y0i implies ci (yi) < ci (y0i) . Thus, ci is
increasing if an increase in all components of yi yields a cost increase.
Let C (m) be the class of continuous and non-decreasing functions C : Rm+ → R+ satisfy-
ing:
• C (0) = 0,
• the functions ci, i = 1, . . . , n, induced by C are increasing,
• ∀Y ∈ Rm+ , ∀i ∈ N : ci (yi) = 0⇒ C (Y ) = C
¡
Y N\{i}
¢
,
• ∀i ∈ N, ∀Y ∈ Rm+ : C
¡
Y N\{i}
¢
= C−i (Y−i) , where C−i is the restriction of C to the
reduced profile Y−i = (y1, . . . , yi−1, yi+1, . . . , yn)
We shall work with this class of functions throughout the paper. Whereas we need the
mild assumption that each ci be increasing, we do not want to impose and we do not need
that C be increasing. In other words, Y ≤ Y 0 ∈ Rm+ and yi ¿ y0i for some i do not necessarily
imply C (Y ) < C (Y 0) . Indeed, C may be the result of a more or less complex aggregation
and optimization procedure. Thus, it is not necessarily increasing in all its components as,
for example, when some public goods are involved. The last two conditions defining C (m)
are natural. A demand from an agent with null stand alone cost has the same impact on
total cost than a null demand and removing an agent with a null demand from a problem
should have no impact on total cost.
In certain circumstances, the shape of the cost function may be of some importance. In
particular, the behavior of the incremental cost, i.e. the change in cost following an increase
in the level of production, may matter. These incremental costs may increase or diminish
with the level of production. We now give a formal content to these concepts. In the following
definition, we treat two increments in two diﬀerent components of Y as equivalent if their
impacts on their respective stand alone costs are the same. In the case of a single private
good, this would imply identical increments.
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Definition 1 A cost function C ∈ C (m) satisfies Diminishing Incremental Cost (DIC) if
for any triple (Y, Y 0, Z) ∈ R3m+ such that Y ≤ Y 0 and any pair (i, j) ∈ N2 such that
ci (yi) ≥ cj (yj) and ci (yi + zi)− ci (yi) = cj (yj + zj)− cj (yj) , the following holds:
C
¡
Y + Z{i}
¢
− C (Y ) ≥ C
¡
Y 0 + Z{j}
¢
− C (Y 0) (1)
It satisfies Increasing Incremental Cost (IIC) if −C satisfies (DIC).
Remark 1 Why should we insist on (1) to declare C as being a (DIC) function? Note that
the condition ci (yi + zi)− ci (yi) = cj (yj + zj)− cj (yj) may be written as:
C
¡
Y {i} + Z{i}
¢
− C
¡
Y {i}
¢
= C
¡
Y {j} + Z{j}
¢
− C
¡
Y {j}
¢
(2)
Adding Y {j} and Y {i} to the arguments of the left and right members respectively should
bring a lower value for both. However, the condition ci (yi) ≥ cj (yj) means that yi is in a
sense “larger” than yj. Thus Y {i} is “larger” than Y {j} and if (DIC) holds, we should expect
the value of the right member of (2) to decrease more than the left one, i.e. C
¡
Y {i,j} + Z{i}
¢
−
C
¡
Y {i,j}
¢
≥ C
¡
Y {i,j} + Z{j}
¢
− C
¡
Y {i,j}
¢
. From this inequality, we may say that Z{i} is
“larger” than Z{j}. Thus, we should have C
¡
Y + Z{i}
¢
− C (Y ) ≥ C
¡
Y + Z{j}
¢
− C (Y ) .
Finally, changing Y for Y 0 in the right member can just reinforce this inequality to meet the
claim that C is a (DIC) function. This is precisely what (1) says.
Note that we may have i = j. Actually, for homogeneous C2 functions, (DIC) is merely
an implication of a property of concavity, namely the second order directional derivatives
are non-positive. (DIC) has itself several implications, which are recorded in the following
lemma.
Lemma 1 Let C ∈ C (m) satisfies (DIC), then:
1. For any triple (Y, Y 0, Z) ∈ R3m+ such that Y ≤ Y 0, the following must hold:
C (Y + Z)− C (Y ) ≥ C (Y 0 + Z)− C (Y 0) (3)
2. For any Z ∈ Rm+ , let I (Z) = {i ∈ N : zi 6= 0} . Then, for any triple (Y, Y 0, Z) ∈ R3m+
such that Y ≤ Y 0, Y + Z ≤ Y 0 + Z{h} for some h ∈ I (Z) , ci (yi) ≥ ch (yh) and
ci (yi + zi)− ci (yi) = ch (yh + zh)− ch (yh) ∀i ∈ I (Z) , the following must hold:
C (Y + Z)− C (Y ) ≥ #I (Z)
¡
C
¡
Y 0 + Z{h}
¢
− C (Y 0)
¢
(4)
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3. For any pair (Y, Y 0) ∈ Rm+ × Rm+ such that Y ≤ Y 0 we have:
nX
i=1
ci (y
0
i)−
nX
i=1
ci (yi) ≥ C (Y 0)− C (Y ) (5)
The above propositions hold with the reverse inequality if C satisfies (IIC).
The proof is given in subsection 7.1.
Remark 2 Condition (3) by itself could be viewed as a (DIC) condition. However, while
(5) follows from (3), we need the stronger Definition 1 to get (4), which will be needed to
prove path cross monotonicity. The definition is stronger in that it involves the variation in
incremental costs with respect to diﬀerent increments in the demand while (3) involves the
same increment. Since condition (5) can be written as
nP
i=1
ci (y
0
i)−C (Y 0) ≥
nP
i=1
ci (yi)−C (Y ) ,
it may be called “increasing benefit from cooperation”.
2.3 The paths
Serial cost sharing requires that larger demands be initially scaled down to a level equivalent
to smaller ones. In some circumstances, it may be natural to adjust all components of the
demand of an agent along the ray to which it belongs, i.e. proportionally. This is the method
used in the Radial Serial Rule. In other circumstances, this may not be appropriate. As
pointed out by Koster et al. (1998) in their Remark 3.7, one can envisage other extensions
of the serial rule using more general paths to scale the demands. This is the idea behind the
Path Serial Rule. This approach requires that we add the rules according to which demands
must be scaled to Q and C in the definition of a cost sharing problem.
For each i ∈ N, consider functions hi : Rmi+1+ → Rmi+ , which map each y ∈ Rmi+ and
τ ∈ R+ onto a vector hi (y, τ) ∈ Rmi+ . Assume that hi (y, · ) is non-decreasing, increasing
without bound in at least one component, and that for each y ∈ Rmi+ , there exists a τ 0 ∈ R+
(necessarily unique) such that hi (y, τ 0) = y. Let Hi be the class of these functions. Then,
hi (y,R+) is the path through y defined by hi (y, · ) . Clearly, the class {hi (y,R+) : y ∈ Rmi+ }
scans Rmi+ since hi is defined for each y ∈ Rmi+ . Finally, let hRi : Rmi+ \ {0} × R+ → Rmi+ be
defined by hRi (y, τ) = τy. This function defines the ray through a y 6= 0.
We do not impose that hi (y, 0) = 0 and that hi (y, · ) be continuous and increasing
in all components. However, given a function C ∈ C (m) , we restrict ourselves to the
class of functions Hi (ci) ⊂ Hi for which ci (hi (y, · )) is continuous and increasing, with
ci (hi (y, 0)) = 0. Since ci (0) = 0 and since ci is increasing, this implies that there is at least
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one null component in hi (y, 0) . In words, a path starts on an axis but not necessarily at
the origin. The cost of the bundle at the starting point is null and increasing thereafter.
This definition of Hi (ci) insures that for any α ∈ R+, there is a unique τα such that
ci (hi (y, τα)) = α.
LetH (C) = H1 (c1)×· · ·×Hn (cn) , H (Y, τ) = (h1 (y1, τ 1) , . . . , hn (yn, τn)), and C (m)×
H = {(C,H) : C ∈ C (m) and H ∈ H (C)} . A cost sharing problem is a triple (Q,C,H) ∈
Rm+ ×C (m)×H (C) . Accordingly, a cost sharing rule is a mapping ξ : Rm+ ×C (m)×H→
Rn+ satisfying the budget balance condition:
nP
i=1
ξi (Q,C,H) = C (Q)
The vector ξ (Q,C,H) is the list of cost shares for the problem (Q,C,H) .
We assume that H is exogenous as is the case of Q. The choice of hi may come from
agent i, be imposed by the planner or be negotiated between all those concerned. The
criteria leading to the adoption of a particular hi may include technological considerations
or preferences. For example, the diﬀerent components of qi may pertain to diﬀerent technical
characteristics of a facility and for technological reasons that only agent i knows, any change
in qi should be done according to a function hi (not necessarily linear) supplied by the agent.
Alternatively, hi may be the expression of a preference by the agent. In the example given
below, each agent has a two-component demand, gas in summer and gas in winter. If these
demands are to be reduced, some agents may prefer a reduction of gas available in summer
rather than a proportional reduction of both. Others may have diﬀerent desiderata.
3 The Path Serial Cost Sharing Rule
In essence, it consists in first ordering individual demands according to their stand alone
costs. Next, a first intermediate demand is constructed by reducing demands of agents 2 to
n along the respective paths specified by the hi, down to the points where their stand alone
costs are the same as for agent 1 and the cost of this intermediate demand is shared equally
among all agents. A second intermediate demand is constructed by reducing demands of
agents 3 to n along the same paths down to the point where their stand alone costs are the
same as for agent 2, etc., and the incremental cost of this intermediate demand as compared
to the first one is shared equally among agents 2 to n.
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Definition 2 (The Path Serial Rule) Given a problem (Q,C,H) ∈ Rm+×C (m)×H (C) ,
suppose, without loss of generality, that agents are ranked according to their ci (qi):
c1 (q1) ≤ c2 (q2) ≤ . . . ≤ cn (qn) .
Then, for each i, consider the intermediate demand Qi = (qi1, . . . , q
i
n) ∈ Rm+ defined by:(
qij = qj if cj (qj) ≤ ci (qi)
qij ∈ hj (qj,R+) and cj
¡
qij
¢
= ci (qi) if cj (qj) > ci (qi)
By definition of H (C) , these intermediate demands are uniquely defined. Finally, the cost
allocation of the Path Serial Rule is given by the following formula:
ξPSi (Q,C,H) =
iX
j=1
C (Qj)− C (Qj−1)
n+ 1− j , i = 1, . . . , n.
Remark 3 The Radial Serial Rule ξRS of Koster et al. (1998) may be seen as the Path Serial
Rule ξPS with the use of hRi as the scaling function for all i, and any pair (Q,C) ∈ Rm+×C (m) .
In short, ξRS (Q,C) = ξPS
¡
Q,C,HR
¢
. Both ξPS and ξRS reduce to the Axial Rule ξA of
Sprumont (1998) when Mi = {i} ∀i and all three reduce to the Moulin-Shenker rule in the
context of the single private good. They are Serial Extensions of the original Serial Rule.
4 Monotonicity
An ethical condition that has received much attention in the literature on cost sharing is
monotonicity of the cost shares with respect to own demands. The Path Serial Rule does
not satisfy the original monotonicity condition in the general context but we show that it
satisfies a weaker form of this condition, called Path Demand Monotonicity. We also examine
the behavior of the cost shares with respect to others’ demands.
Definition 3 A cost sharing rule ξ : Rm+ ×C (m)×H→ Rn+ satisfies Demand Monotonicity
(DM) if for two problems (Q,C,H) and (Q0, C,H 0) ∈ Rm+ × C (m)×H (C) , and any i ∈ N
such that qi ≤ q0i and qj = q0j ∀j ∈ N\ {i} , we have ξi (Q,C,H) ≤ ξi (Q0, C,H 0) .
(DM) says that an agent should expect to pay more if he increases his demand. This
does not imply that the other agents will not pay more as we shall see. Sprumont (1998)
proves that the Axial Rule ξA satisfies (DM) in the context where Mi = {i} ∀i. We show
in Téjédo and Truchon (2000) that this is not the case of the Radial Serial Rule ξRS even in
the homogeneous context. A fortiori, the Path Serial Rule ξPS does not satisfy (DM) in the
general context. This motivates the next definition.
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Definition 4 A cost sharing rule ξ : Rm+ × C (m) × H → Rn+ satisfies Path Demand
Monotonicity (PDM) if for two problems (Q,C,H) and (Q0, C,H) ∈ Rm+ × C (m)×H (C) ,
for any i ∈ N such that qi ∈ hi (q0i,R+) , qi ≤ q0i, and qj = q0j ∀j ∈ N\ {i} , we have
ξi (Q,C,H) ≤ ξi (Q0, C,H) .
Ideally if the cost function satisfies decreasing incremental cost (DIC), then the cost share
of an agent i should not increase when the demand of another agent k increases and it should
not decrease when the cost function satisfies increasing incremental cost (IIC). We shall show
that this is the case with the Path Serial Rule.
Definition 5 A cost sharing rule ξ : Rm+×C (m)×H→ Rn+ satisfies Path Cross Monotonicity
(PCM) if for two problems (Q,C,H) and (Q0, C,H) ∈ Rm+ × C (m) × H (C) such that
qk ∈ hk (q0k,R+) and qk ≤ q0k for some k and qj = q0j ∀j 6= k, we have:
• ξi (Q,C,H) ≥ ξi (Q0, C,H) ∀i ∈ N/ {k} whenever C is a DIC cost function;
• ξi (Q,C,H) ≤ ξi (Q0, C,H) ∀i ∈ N/ {k} whenever C is an IIC cost function,
i.e. ξi is a non-decreasing function along the path hk (qk,R+) .
Theorem 1 ξPS satisfies (PDM) and (PCM).
The proof is given in subsection 7.2. Of course, we should expect the relation between
ξPSi (Q,C,H) and ξPSi (Q0, C,H) to hold when more than one component of Q is increased
to give Q0. This is recorded in the following corollary.
Corollary 1 Consider two problems (Q,C,H) and (Q0, C,H) ∈ Rm+ × C (m)×H (C) such
that ∃i ∈ N : ∀j 6= i : qj ∈ hj
¡
q0j,R+
¢
and qj ≤ q0j. Then:
• ξPSi (Q,C,H) ≥ ξPSi (Q0, C,H) whenever C is a DIC cost function;
• ξPSi (Q,C,H) ≤ ξPSi (Q0, C,H) whenever C is an IIC cost function.
The proof is given in subsection 7.3.
5 Bounds for Cost Shares
If they are free to decide, agents will choose to participate in a cost sharing problem only
if they are guaranteed that their share of the cost will not be larger than their stand alone
cost. This is a condition that Moulin and Shenker (1992) calls participation. We show
8
that the Path Serial Rule meets this condition whenever C satisfies increasing benefit from
cooperation, defined in Remark 2. Actually, under (DIC), the Path Serial Rule satisfies a
stronger property. Any coalition of agents is guaranteed that their total share of the cost will
not be larger than their stand alone cost as a coalition, a condition called the Stand Alone
Test by Faulhaber (1975) and similar to the core property in cooperative game theory. We
show that these properties, established by Moulin (1996) in the single private good context,
extend to the general context of this paper under increasing benefit from cooperation or
diminishing incremental cost.
If the cost function satisfies (IIC) instead of (DIC), we should not expect all agents to
be willing to cooperate since at least one of them will have to pay more than its stand alone
cost. However, there may be circumstances where agents are forced to cooperate even if the
cost function satisfies (IIC). In such a case, we could impose that each agent or coalition
pays at least its stand alone cost, the reverse of the previous conditions.1 The Path Serial
rule satisfies these reverse conditions.
Definition 6 A cost sharing rule ξ : Rm+ × C (m) × H → Rn+ satisfies Participation if
∀ (Q,C,H) ∈ Rm+ ×C (m)×H (C) :
• ξi (Q,C,H) ≤ ci (qi) ∀i ∈ N whenever C satisfies increasing benefit from cooperation;
• ξi (Q,C,H) ≥ ci (qi) ∀i ∈ N whenever C satisfies decreasing benefit from cooperation.
Theorem 2 The Path Serial Rule ξPS satisfies Participation.
The proof is given in subsection 7.4.
Definition 7 A cost sharing rule ξ : Rm+ × C (m)×H→ Rn+ satisfies the Stand Alone Test
(SAT) if ∀ (Q,C,H) ∈ Rm+ × C (m)×H (C) :
• Pi∈S ξi (Q,C,H) ≤ C ¡QS¢ for any subset S ⊂ N whenever C is a DIC cost function;
• Pi∈S ξi (Q,C,H) ≥ C ¡QS¢ for any subset S ⊂ N whenever C is an IIC cost function.
Theorem 3 Any cost sharing rule ξ : Rm+ × C (m) × H → Rn+ that satisfies (PCM) also
meets the Stand Alone Test (SAT).
1This can be seen as a fairness condition, to which Moulin and Shenker (1992) gave the name of Stand
Alone Test. However, Faulhaber (1975), Moulin (1996), and others reserve this name for the condition
defined above. In this paper, we cover both conditions under the same name.
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The proof is given in subsection 7.5. The following corollary is immediate since ξPS
satisfies (PCM).
Corollary 2 The Path Serial Rule ξPS satisfies (SAT).
Remark 4 Participation follows obviously from (SAT). However, we have been able to
establish this property under the weaker increasing benefit from cooperation.
The other question of interest in the case of an IIC cost function is whether there is a
reasonable upper bound on the contribution of each agent. In order to introduce such a
bound, we first define for each i an equal cost demand Q˜i ∈ Rm+ by scaling the demands up
or down so as to satisfy:
qj ∈ hj
¡
q˜ij,R+
¢
and cj
¡
q˜ij
¢
= ci (qi) if cj (qj) < ci (qi)
q˜ij ∈ hj (qj,R+) and cj
¡
q˜ij
¢
= ci (qi) if cj (qj) ≥ ci (qi)
We then have the following condition.
Definition 8 A cost sharing rule ξ : Rm+ ×C (m)×H→ Rn+ satisfies the Equal Cost Bound
(ECB) for a problem (Q,C,H) ∈ Rm+ × C (m)×H (C) if:
ξi (Q,C,H) ≤
C
³
Q˜i
´
n
∀i ∈ N
For a homogeneous problem, C
³
Q˜i
´
= c (n qi) . Thus, the condition generalizes the
Unanimity Bound of Moulin and Shenker (1992). Clearly, ξPS satisfies (ECB) for DIC cost
functions. We shall now show that this bound is also satisfied for IIC cost functions.
Theorem 4 The Path Serial Rule ξPS satisfies (ECB) for any class of problems (Q,C,H) ∈
Rm+ ×C (m)×H (C) such that C is an IIC cost function.
Proof. Since q˜ij ≥ qij = qj ∀j < i and q˜ij = qij ∀j ≥ i, applying Corollary 1, we have:
ξPSi (Q,C,H) = ξPSi
¡
Qi, C,H
¢
≤ ξPSi
³
Q˜i, C,H
´
=
C
³
Q˜i
´
n
∀i ∈ N
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6 Conclusion
In Téjédo and Truchon (2002), we have have defined the Path Serial Cost Sharing Rule to
deal with problems where agents request several commodities that can be public, private, or
specific to some of them and where aggregation may be very general. As it names implies,
it consists in scaling down the demands along paths, which are part of the specification of
the problem, in order to construct the intermediate demands that are at the root of serial
cost sharing. Put diﬀerently, the Path Serial Rule consists in applying the original Serial
Cost Sharing Rule to a projection of each demand onto the specified path. The rule is char-
acterized by the Equal Treatment of Equivalents (demands) and the Path Serial Principle,
and it satisfies other properties such as Independence of Null Agents, Rank Independence of
Irrelevant Agents, and Ordinality.
In the present paper, we have extended the analysis of this rule by examining how the
cost share of an agent varies with respect to its own demand and the one of other agents. We
have shown that the Path Serial Rule satisfies Path Demand Monotonicity and Path Cross
Monotonicity. The first says that the cost share of an agent does not decrease if the demand
of this agent increases along the path specified with its demand. The second prescribes that
under increasing returns, the cost share of an agent must not increase if some other agent
increases its demand along the path specified with its demand ant that it must not decrease
under decreasing returns.
We have also provided bounds for cost shares under increasing and decreasing returns.
More precisely, under increasing returns, no agent and no subset of agents pay more than
their stand alone cost. Under decreasing returns, no agent and no subset of agents pay less
than their stand alone cost. These results generalize similar results of Moulin and Shenker
(1994) and Moulin (1996) for the original Serial Rule.
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7 Proofs
7.1 Proof of Lemma 1
1. Applying (1) iteratively to the triples
¡
Y + Z{1,... ,i−1}, Y 0 + Z{1,... ,i−1}, Z
¢
and the pair
(i, i) , i = 1, . . . , n, with Z∅ = 0, to get
C
¡
Y + Z{1,... ,i}
¢
− C
¡
Y + Z{1,... ,i−1}
¢
≥ C
¡
Y 0 + Z{1,... ,i}
¢
− C
¡
Y 0 + Z{1,... ,i−1}
¢
and summing member-wise over i yields (3).
2. Consider any increasing sequence S1, S2, . . . , S#I(Z) of proper subsets of I (Z) such
that h belongs only to S#I(Z) and let S0 = ∅. Note that j is the cardinality of Sj and
that Y + ZSj ≤ Y 0, j = 1, . . . ,#I (Z)− 1. Thus, by (DIC), we can write
C
¡
Y + ZSj
¢
− C
¡
Y + ZSj−1
¢
≥ C
¡
Y 0 + Z{h}
¢
− C (Y 0) , j = 1, . . . ,#I (Z)
with ZS0 = 0. Summing over all j ∈ I (Z) yields (4).
3. Consider the triples
³
Y {i}, Y 0{i}, Zˆi
´
where Zˆi =
¡
y1, . . . , yi−1, 0, y
0
i+1, . . . , y
0
n
¢
,
i = 1, . . . , n. Then, using (3) on each triple, we get
C
¡
y1, . . . , yi−1, yi, y
0
i+1, . . . , y
0
n
¢
− C (0, . . . , 0, yi, 0, . . . , 0)
≥ C
¡
y1, . . . , yi−1, y
0
i, y
0
i+1, . . . , y
0
n
¢
− C (0, . . . , 0, y0i, 0, . . . , 0)
from which:
ci (y
0
i)− ci (yi) = C (0, . . . , 0, y0i, 0, . . . , 0)− C (0, . . . , 0, yi, 0, . . . , 0)
≥ C
¡
y1, . . . , yi−1, y
0
i, y
0
i+1, . . . , y
0
n
¢
− C
¡
y1, . . . , yi−1, yi, y
0
i+1, . . . , y
0
n
¢
Summing member-wise over i yields (5).
7.2 Proof of Theorem 1
Consider two problems (Q,C,H) and (Q0, C,H) ∈ Rm+×C (m)×H (C) such that C is an IIC
cost function and such that qk ∈ hk (q0k,R+) , q0k ≥ qk and q0j = qj ∀j 6= k.We shall show that
ξPSi (Q,C,H) ≤ ξPSi (Q0, C,H) ∀i ∈ N.We first suppose that c1 (q1) ≤ c2 (q2) ≤ . . . ≤ cn (qn)
and c1 (q01) ≤ c2 (q02) ≤ . . . ≤ cn (q0n) . We must distinguish four cases:
• i < k : In this case, ξPSi (Q0, C,H) = ξPSi (Q,C,H) by (PSP).
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• i = k : In this case, ξPSi (Q0, C,H) ≥ ξPSi (Q,C,H) since C (Q0i) ≥ C (Qi) , C (Q0i−1) =
C (Qi−1) , and ξPSj (Q0, C,H) = ξPSj (Q,C,H) ∀j < k. This, together with the comple-
ment given below for the case where the ranks of the agents are changed when going
from Q to Q0, establishes (PDM).
• i = k + 1 : Note that
ξPSk+1 (Q,C,H) =
k−1X
j=1
ξPSj (Q,C,H) +
C
¡
Qk
¢
− C
¡
Qk−1
¢
n− k + 1 +
C
¡
Qk+1
¢
− C
¡
Qk
¢
n− k
By (PSP), we know that ξPSj (Q0, C,H) = ξPSj (Q,C,H) ∀j < k. We shall show that
C
¡
Qk
¢
− C
¡
Qk−1
¢
n− k + 1 +
C
¡
Qk+1
¢
− C
¡
Qk
¢
n− k
≤
C
¡
Q0k
¢
− C
¡
Q0k−1
¢
n− k + 1 +
C
¡
Q0k+1
¢
− C
¡
Q0k
¢
n− k , (6)
which is equivalent to:
C
¡
Q0k
¢
− C
¡
Qk
¢
≤ (n− k + 1)
¡
C
¡
Q0k+1
¢
− C
¡
Qk+1
¢¢
This is a necessary condition for ξPSk+1 (Q,C,H) ≤ ξPSk+1 (Q0, C,H) to hold.
Let Y = Qk, Y 0 = Qk+1, Z = Q0k − Qk =
¡
0, . . . , 0, q0kk − qkk , . . . , q0kn − qkn
¢
and note
that Q0k+1 − Qk+1 = Z{k}. By definition, we have cj
¡
q0kj
¢
= ck (q
0
k) and cj (yj) =
cj
¡
qkj
¢
= ck (qk) = ck (yk) ∀j ≥ k, from which cj
¡
q0kj
¢
− cj
¡
qkj
¢
= ck (q
0
k)− ck (qk) , i.e.
cj (yj + zj) − cj (yj) = ck (yk + zk) − ck (yk) ∀i, j ≥ k. Also note that Y + Z = Q0k ≤
Q0k+1 = Y 0 +Z{k}. Thus, (6) follows from part 2 of Lemma 1 and more precisely from
(4) with the reversed inequality.
• i > k + 1 : In this case, Q0i − Qi = Q0i−1 − Qi−1, with q0k − qk as the only positive
component and Qi−1 ≤ Qi. Thus, C (Q0i−1)−C (Qi−1) ≤ C (Q0i)−C (Qi) by (IIC) or
part 1 of Lemma 1, from which C (Qi) − C (Qi−1) ≤ C (Q0i) − C (Q0i−1). Combining
this last inequality with ξPSj (Q,C,H) ≤ ξPSj (Q0, C,H) ∀j < i yields the result.
Next, suppose that the order of the stand alone costs is changed when going from
Q to Q0. More precisely, suppose that ck+p
¡
q0k+p
¢
< ck (q
0
k) for some p ≤ n − k and
ck (q
0
k) ≤ ck+p+1
¡
q0k+p+1
¢
whenever k + p + 1 ≤ n. Then, consider a sequence Q =
Qˆ0, Qˆ1, . . . , Qˆp = Q0, where qˆ`j = qj ∀j 6= k and where qˆ`k is chosen so that qk ∈
hk
¡
qˆ`k,R+
¢
and ck
¡
qˆ`k
¢
= ck+` (qk+`) , ` = 1, . . . , p− 1. In other words, Qˆ1 is obtained
by increasing qk to get a qˆ1k such that qk ∈ hk (qˆ1k,R+) and c (qˆ1k) = ck+1 (qk+1) . Qˆ2
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is obtained by further increasing qk until its stand alone cost reaches ck+2 (qk+2) and
so on until Qˆp. Note that the ranks k and k + ` may be interchanged in each of the
problems
³
Qˆ`, C,H
´
, ` = 1, . . . , p, without changing the cost shares for each problem
under ξPS. Therefore, ξPSi is non-decreasing along this sequence of problems and thus:
ξPSi (Q,C,H) ≤ ξPSi
³
Qˆ1, C,H
´
≤ ξPSi
³
Qˆp, C,H
´
= ξPSi (Q0, C,H)
It suﬃces to change the sense of the relevant inequalities when C is a DIC cost function.
7.3 Proof of Corollary 1
Suppose that C is an IIC cost function and consider a sequence Q = Qˆ0, Qˆ1, . . . , Qˆn = Q0,
in which each term Qˆk is defined by:
qˆkj =
(
q0j if j ≤ k
qj if j > k
In plain word, each component is increased, if needed, one at a time along this sequence until
Q0 is reached. Then, by Theorem 1, ξPSi is non-decreasing along the sequence of problems³
Qˆk, C,H
´
, k = 1, . . . , n, and thus:
ξPSi (Q,C,H) ≤ ξPSi
³
Qˆ1, C,H
´
≤ · · · ≤ ξPSi
³
Qˆn, C,H
´
= ξPSi (Q0, C,H)
7.4 Proof of Theorem 2
Suppose that C satisfies increasing benefit from cooperation. We proceed by induction.
With Y = 0 and Y 0 = Q1 in (5), we get C (Q1) ≤ n c1 (q1) , from which:
ξ1 (Q,C,H) =
C (Q1)
n
≤ c1 (q1)
Next, suppose that ξi−1 ≤ ci−1 (qi−1) is true and note that:
nX
j=1
cj
¡
qij
¢
=
i−1X
j=1
cj (qj) + (n− i+ 1) ci (qi)
nX
j=1
cj
¡
qi−1j
¢
=
i−1X
j=1
cj (qj) + (n− i+ 1) ci−1 (qi−1)
Then, (5) of Lemma 1 implies:
C
¡
Qi
¢
− C
¡
Qi−1
¢
≤ (n− i+ 1) [ci (qi)− ci−1 (qi−1)]
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Collecting all the above yields:
ξi (Q,C,H) = ξi−1 (Q,C,H) +
C (Qi)− C (Qi−1)
n− i+ 1
≤ ci−1 (qi−1) +
C (Qi)− C (Qi−1)
n− i+ 1
≤ ci (qi)
It suﬃce to reverse all inequalities when C satisfies decreasing benefit from cooperation.
7.5 Proof of Theorem 3
Consider a cost sharing rule ξ satisfying (PCM), a problem (Q,C,H) ∈ Rm+ ×C (m)×H (C)
where C is a DIC cost function, and any proper subset S ⊂ N. Let Q˜ be the profile of
demands obtained by substituting hi (qi, 0) to qi in Q for all i /∈ S. By definition of H (C) ,
we have ci (hi (qi, 0)) = 0 and by definition of C (m) , C
³
Q˜N\S
´
= 0. Since Q˜N\SS ≤ Q˜S,
using (PCM), more precisely Corollary 1, we get ξi
³
Q˜, C,H
´
≤ ξi
³
Q˜N\S, C,H
´
= 0 ∀i /∈ S,
from which ξi
³
Q˜, C,H
´
= 0 ∀i /∈ S. Thus,
X
i∈S
ξi
³
Q˜, C,H
´
=
X
i∈N
ξi
³
Q˜, C,H
´
= C
³
Q˜
´
= C
¡
QS
¢
where the last equality follows from the definition of C (m) . Using the above, (PCM), and
the fact that Q˜N\S ≤ QN\S, we finally get:X
i∈S
ξi (Q,C,H) ≤
X
i∈S
ξi
³
Q˜, C,H
´
= C
¡
QS
¢
The proof is similar when C is an IIC cost function.
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